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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
How to Count to Fifteen:
Determining the Jurisdictional Scope
of Title VII
by Barbara J. Fick
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII") prohibits employ-
ment discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
The prohibition, however, applies
only to an employer "who has 15 or
more employees for each working
day in each of 20 or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b). It thus becomes impor-
tant to establish the number of
workers an employer has in order
to decide if that particular employer
is subject to Title VIIs employment
discrimination prohibition.
The statute is clear that there must
be 15 employees, but it is less clear
as to the means of counting the
number of employees. Does the
statutory phrase "15 or more
employees for each working day in
each of 20 or more calendar weeks"
mean that only those employees
physically present at work or on
leave for each working day in a
week are counted, or does it mean
that all employees carried on the
payroll for each working day of the
week are counted? This case
requires the Supreme Court to
interpret that phrase and decide
how to count employees.
Barbara J. Fick is associate
professor of law at the Notre Dame
Law School, Notre Dame, IN;
(219) 631-5864.
ISSUE
How should a court count the num-
ber of employees to determine if a
particular employer must comply
with the antidiscrimination require-
ments imposed by Title VII?
FACTS
Metropolitan Educational
Enterprises, Inc. ("Metropolitan")
sells and finances encyclopedias,
dictionaries, and other educational
materials through door-to-door sales.
Darlene Walters worked for
Metropolitan as a collector from
1986 to April 1990. In April 1990
Walters filed a Title VII charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (the "EEOC" or the
"Commission") alleging that
Metropolitan had denied her a pro-
motion based on gender. Shortly
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after Metropolitan received notice
that Walters had filed the charge, it
fired her. Walters then filed a sec-
ond charge with the EEOC claiming
that she was terminated in retalia-
tion for filing the first charge.
In April 1993 the Commission filed
a lawsuit in federal district court
alleging that Metropolitan's dis-
charge of Walters was illegal retalia-
tion in violation of Section 704(a) of
Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
Section 704(a) prohibits adverse
employment actions based on an
employee's filing a charge or
participating in proceedings
under Title VII.
Walters entered the EEOC's lawsuit
as a plaintiff. She alleged that
Metropolitan discriminated against
her on the basis of gender when it
denied her a promotion; she also
alleged retaliatory discharge.
Metropolitan filed a motion to dis-
miss for lack of subject matter juris-
diction, claiming that it was not a
covered employer under Title VII
because it did not employ 15 or
more employees for each working
day for 20 or more calendar weeks.
In order to verify this defense, the
parties engaged in extensive discov-
ery relating to the employment sta-
tus of Metropolitan's work force.
(Refer to Glossary for the definition
of discovery.)
After discovery, the parties agreed
to the following facts regarding
Metropolitan's work schedule and
employees. For 1990 Leonard
Bieber, Metropolitan's president, was
the only salaried employee; there
were two regular part-time employ-
ees and 13 regular full-time employ-
ees, all of whom were paid hourly.
Metropolitan's regular workdays
were Monday through Friday, from
9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. During 1990,
Metropolitan had 15 or more
employees on its payroll on each
working day of 47 calendar weeks
but had 15 or more employees
physically present at work or on
paid leave for only nine weeks.
The EEOC and Walters asserted
that the district court should count
the number of employees on
Metropolitan's weekly payroll to
determine whether or not it had
subject matter jurisdiction over
Metropolitan. Under the test urged
by the Commission and Walters
known as the payroll test,
Metropolitan would be subject to
the antidiscrimination provisions
of Title VII.
Metropolitan countered that the
court should count only those
employees either physically present
at work or on paid leave for each
day of the workweek. Under this
test, known as the day-by-day test,
Metropolitan was not an employer
for purposes of Title VII and, thus,
was outside the jurisdictional scope
of the statute.
The district court held that it was
bound to apply the day-by-day
method for counting employees and
granted Metropolitan's motion to
dismiss. 864 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ill.
1994). The district court, which is
within the jurisdiction of the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, ruled that it was
required to follow the Seventh
Circuit's decision announced in
Zimmerman v. North American
Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347 (7th Cir.
1983), which, in interpreting identi-
cal jurisdictional language of the
Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (the "ADEA"), 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b), endorsed the day-by-day
method.
The Commission and Walters
appealed the district court's
decision to the Seventh Circuit
which affirmed on the basis of
Zimmerman. 60 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir.
1995). The Supreme Court granted
the separate petitions for a writ of
certiorari filed by the EEOC and
Walters to decide whether the pay-
roll method or the day-by-day
method is the more appropriate
basis for determining jurisdiction
under Title VII. The cases have been
consolidated for argument and
decision. 116 S. Ct. 1260 (1996).
CASE ANALYSIS
The federal circuit courts of appeals
are split on the issue of which
method should be used to count
employees. The payroll method
counts all employees who are car-
ried on the payroll for the calendar
week, whether those employees
are physically present or on paid
leave for each day. The day-by-day
method counts all salaried workers
for every day of the week whether
they are present at work or not, but
counts only those hourly employees
who are physically present at work
or on paid leave. In effect, this latter
method counts as employees only
those workers who actually receive
pay for each day of the workweek.
The First and Fifth Circuits as well
as the EEOC have endorsed the
payroll method. Thurber v. Jack
Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633 (1st Cir.
1983); Dumas v. Town of Mount
Vernon, 612 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.
1980). In interpreting the phrase
"has 15 or more employees for each
working day," these two courts focus
on the word "has," which they inter-
pret to mean that the employer is in
an employment relationship with 15
or more employees for each working
day, i.e., the employer has 15 or
more employees whether or not
they actually work during the
employer's workweek.
The payroll method determines if
the employer has in its employ 15 or
more employees during a particular
workweek. If an employee is carried
on the payroll for the week, that
Issue No. 2
person is an employee for each
working day of that week. For exam-
ple, an employee who severs his or
her employment relationship with
the employer on a Wednesday
would not be counted as an employ-
ee for that calendar week because
the employee would not have been
in an employment relationship with
that employer for each working day
that week. On the other hand, a
part-time employee who works only
two days a week would be counted
for the entire week because that
person remains in the employment
relationship for every working day
that week.
The payroll method counts all
employees equally based on the
existence of an employment rela-
tionship, whereas the day-by-day
method results in distinctions
among workers that seem somewhat
artificial. First, the day-by-day
method makes a distinction
between salaried workers (who are
counted whether physically present
or not) and hourly workers (who are
counted only if present or on paid
leave). Yet the statutory language
itself draws no distinction between
these two classes of workers.
Second, the day-by-day method
would count employees who work
only two hours a day every work-
day, but the method would not
count employees who work 10
hours for four days of an employer's
regular workweek but do not work
on the fifth day.
There is also some indication in the
legislative history of Title VII that
the payroll method is consistent
with congressional intent in using
the phrase "for each working day."
In discussing the employer coverage
issue, Senator Dirksen, the then-
minority leader, referred to the defi-
nition of employer used in unem-
ployment compensation law as pro-
viding a basis for the language used
in Title VII. Under this body of law,
the focus is on the employment rela-
tionship as the controlling factor for
counting employees.
Congress also used the phrase "for
each working day" in defining the
jurisdictional coverage of the Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (the
"FMLA"). 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i).
Both the House of Representatives
and Senate reports accompanying
the FMLA explain that Congress
intended the phrase to be construed
in accordance with the payroll
method for counting employees.
Lastly, it can be argued that the
payroll method is more efficient to
apply. It requires only an examina-
tion of the payroll records which
federal tax laws mandate must be
kept by employers, while the day-
by-day method necessitates review-
ing the daily work history of every
employee.
The Seventh Circuit, as illustrated in
this case, and the Eighth Circuit
apply the day-by-day method, stat-
ing that it is the only method that
gives meaning to the statutory
phrase "for each working day." See,
e.g., EEOC v. Garden & Assocs.,
Ltd., 956 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1992).
A general rule of statutory construc-
tion requires that a statute should
not be interpreted in a way that
renders words or phrases meaning-
less, redundant, or superfluous.
Under this rule, which is advanced
vigorously by Metropolitan, courts
assume that Congress had a reason
for including all the language found
in the statute. In applying this
principle of statutory construction,
courts using the day-by-day method
have held that the payroll method
fails to give meaning to the phrase
"for each working day" because the
payroll method counts, for example,
employees who work only on
Mondays as employees for every
day of the week.
American Bar Association
Metropolitan also argues that iso-
lated remarks by legislators during
congressional debates on Title VII
do not provide a firm foundation
for interpreting statutory language.
Moreover, congressional reports
interpreting the FMLA may not
be a reliable indicator of what
Congress intended 30 years earlier
when it enacted Title VII.
Metropolitan argues further that
the EEOC's interpretation of the
statutory phrase "15 or more
employees for each working day"
is not entitled to deference. The
EEOC guidelines endorsing the
payroll method were issued after
several courts had already rejected
that method; also, the determina-
tion of an Executive Branch
agency's jurisdictional authority is
an issue for the courts, not for the
agency, to decide.
SIGNIFICANCE
Title VII is not the only statute that
defines jurisdiction based on the
number of employees employed
"for each working day in each of 20
or more calendar weeks." The ADEA,
as already noted, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the
"ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A),
use this same language. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court's decision in
this case will apply with equal
force in determining the jurisdic-
tional coverage of those statutes.
Companies are increasingly reliant
on part-time workers as well as on
flexible working arrangements for
their full-time workers. In 1994
almost 20 percent of all workers -
about 24 million employees -
worked part-time. In 1991 some
15 percent of full-time workers -
about 12 million employees - had
flexible work schedules. In con-
trast, at least 12 percent of all
employers fall within just a few
employees of Title VII's 15-employ-
ee jurisdictional minimum.
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A decision to use the day-by-day
method could result in many
employers remaining outside the
reach of federal antidiscrimination
laws because the day-to-day method
has the effect of undercounting
employees. For example, full time
employees who work a five-day,
40-hour week would not be counted
if the employer operated on a seven-
day-a-week basis because full-time
workers would not be physically
present at work "for each working
day" in the calendar week. And
part-time workers who are regularly
scheduled to work three days a
week out of a five-day workweek
would also not be counted; neither
would full-time workers who are on
compressed schedules of four
10-hour workdays out of a five-day
workweek.
A decision for Metropolitan does not
necessarily leave employers home
free. Even if an employer does not
fall within the scope of Title VII's
jurisdiction, it might be required to
comply with existing state laws pro-
hibiting employment discrimination,
although there are at least three
states that do not have such laws.
The Court's decision in this case, at
bottom, will either broaden the
range of employers subject to the
jurisdiction of Title VII, the ADEA,
the ADA, and similar laws or narrow
their numbers. In the world of glob-
al competition and downsizing, the
Court's decision will have major
repercussions for both sides.
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